The problem of privatizing statistical databases is a well-studied topic that has culminated with the notion of differential privacy. The complementary problem of securing these differentially private databases, however, has-as far as we know-not been considered in the past. While the security of private databases is in theory orthogonal to the problem of private statistical analysis (e.g., in the central model of differential privacy the curator is trusted) the recent real-world deployments of differentially-private systems suggest that it will become a problem of increasing importance. In this work, we consider the problem of designing encrypted databases (EDB) that support differentially-private statistical queries. More precisely, these EDBs should support a set of encrypted operations with which a curator can securely query and manage its data, and a set of private operations with which an analyst can privately analyze the data. Using such an EDB, a curator can securely outsource its database to an untrusted server (e.g., on-premise or in the cloud) while still allowing an analyst to privately query it. We show how to design an EDB that supports private histogram queries. As a building block, we introduce a differentially-private encrypted counter based on the binary mechanism of Chan et al. (ICALP, 2010). We then carefully combine multiple instances of this counter with a standard encrypted database scheme to support differentially-private histogram queries.
tous and support decision making in almost every domain, including, technology, finance, education, Government, sports and national security; just to name a few. In fact, the proliferation and significance of statistical databases has motivated the important and active field of private statistical analysis which includes work on privacy attacks [23, 53, 62] and on the design of statistical mechanisms that achieve various notions of privacy like k-anonymity, -diversity and, ultimately, differential privacy as introduced by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith [25] .
In this setting, a trusted curator stores the database and responds to statistical queries made by an untrusted analyst. By answering these queries with a differentiallyprivate mechanism, the curator can guarantee that the analyst gets responses within some bound of the correct answer in such a way that the presence or absence of an individual person/entity does not affect the output of the mechanism by much. Over the last fifteen years, research in differential privacy has produced a multitude of mechanisms to support a wide array of statistical analyses. In turn, these advances have lead to real-world deployments of differentially-private statistical databases in various domains. Some of the most high-profile examples include the Census Bureau's deployment of differential privacy in their OnTheMap project which supports analysis on the travel patterns of commuters [49] , Apple's deployment of local differential privacy to study emoji usage, health data and media preferences [22] , and Google's deployment of local differential privacy to analyze Chrome settings [30] .
While it is clear that the problem of "privatizing" statistical databases has received significant attention, as far as we know, the complementary problem of securing differentially private statistical databases has not been considered. While the security of statistical databases is in theory orthogonal to the problem of private statistical analysis-indeed in this setting the curator is trusted-we believe that the growing number of real-world deployments of differential privacy will increasingly highlight the problem of how exactly curators should protect their data. This question is even more pertinent given the highly sensitive nature of the datawhich is why differentially-private mechanisms are used in the first place-and the constant occurrences of data breaches.
Security via pan privacy. One approach to addressing this security problem is to use a pan-private mechanism [26, 27] which, roughly speaking, generates a representation of the data-called the state-in such a way that differential privacy is preserved even against an analyst that has access to this state (in addition to the answers to its statistical queries). For example, by using a pan-private mechanism and only storing the state, a curator could maintain a differential-privacy guarantee in case of a data breach. While this is an improvement over storing the database in plaintext, this approach has some limitations. For instance, since the pan-private mechanisms is lossy, the curator may not be able to recover its data. Another limitation is that it only guarantees differential privacy against any adversary, whereas it would be preferable to provide stronger guarantees against non-analyst adversaries. In other words, while differential privacy is a strong (and perhaps the best) guarantee possible against an adversary that is allowed to compute statistical queries on the data, one would like a stronger guarantee against adversaries that cannot make such queries. A third limitation is that many panprivate mechanisms achieve poor utility if used to guard against more than a single intrusion which severely limits their usefulness in protecting against data breaches, malicious servers etc.
Security via encrypted databases.
Over the last fifteen years, the area of encrypted search has emerged as a promising solution to the problem of database security and data breaches. Using an encrypted database, a client/application can store and query its data on an untrusted server without exposing itself to the risk of insider and outsider threats, data breaches and even unintentional data disclosures (e.g., due to misconfigured access control lists). Solutions for various kinds of databases and with varying levels of security have been considered in the past, including for simple key-value stores (i.e., dictionaries) [17, 20] , multi-maps [18, 21, 39, 41, 42, 54] , graph databases [20, 51] and relational databases [37, 57] . The availability of such a diverse set of encrypted database solutions, motivates the following natural question:
Can we design private encrypted databases; that is, encrypted databases that support differentially-private statistical queries?
With such a solution, a curator could store its database on any untrusted server while still allowing analysts to conduct private statistical analysis on the data.
As a concrete example, the Census Bureau could outsource the storage and management of its OnTheMap data to a server in Amazon's cloud without losing any of the properties provided by its differentially-private mechanism.
At a high-level, our goal is to design encrypted databases that support both encrypted and private operations. The encrypted operations include query and update operations and are used by the curator to query and maintain the database. The private operations include statistical query operations used by the analyst to analyze the data. Roughly speaking, a private encrypted database should provide security against an untrusted server and differential-privacy against an untrusted analyst.
Our Contributions
In this work we introduce and address the problem of securing private statistical databases. We make the following contributions.
Private encrypted databases.
One of the contributions of this work is to delineate the scope of the problem and to propose a set of reasonable properties that any encrypted and private statistical database should achieve. We do this formally by extending the notion of structured encryption [20] to support, in addition to a set of encrypted queries, a set of differentially-private queries. The encrypted queries are used by the curator to query and modify the database while the private queries are used by the analyst to analyze the data.
New adversarial models. In our setting, there are multiple adversaries to consider, including the server that stores the database, the analyst that analyzes the data and, possibly, an adversary that compromises the server at a point in time and gets a snapshot of the database.
More formally, the first corresponds to a persistent adversary that compromises the server perpetually and can monitor the transcripts of the interactions between the curator, the analyst and the server. The second corresponds to a statistical adversary that has access to the results of the private queries but not necessarily to the transcript of the entire interaction. This captures the standard untrusted analyst in differential privacy that tries to infer information about the data from the responses of its queries. The third is a snapshot adversary that gets multiple accesses to the database stored on the server but does not have access to the transcripts of any interactions. This captures scenarios such as data breaches, devices thefts, and subpoenas.
There are several interesting subtleties that emerge from this setting that must be addressed. Recall that in the traditional setting of differential privacy, the curator is trusted so one does not consider any security/privacy guarantees for the analyst. In our setting, however, the database is stored on an untrusted server so the analyst's queries must also be protected. Another subtlety is that, in our setting, the data stored in the database is continually modified which requires differential privacy to hold under continual observations. An encrypted database for private histogram queries. As a concrete goal, we focus on designing private encrypted databases that support differentiallyprivate histogram queries. Histograms are one of the most common and central queries in statistical analysis and many other important queries can be formulated as histograms (e.g., contingency tables, marginals).
A naive approach to solving our problem would be for the curator to use a structured encryption scheme to produce an EDB and then use a pan-private histogram mechanism to produce a pan-private state. The curator would then use the EDB to query and manage its data and the server would use the pan-private state to answer analyst queries. The main limitation of this approach, however, is that it only guarantees differential privacy against persistent and snapshot adversaries whereas we would like a stronger guarantee.
To achieve this, we have to combine techniques from structured encryption and differential privacy in a more careful manner. Our first step, is to design an encrypted counter that supports an encrypted add operation and a differentially-private read operation. We build such a counter using additively homomorphic encryption and a differentially-private counter of Chan, Shi and Song [19] . We refer to the resulting construction as CPX. We then combine a standard encrypted data structure with several instantiations of our encrypted counter to build a private encrypted database that supports private histogram queries. There are several subtleties that come up-not only due to our new adversarial models-but also due to subtle and potentially dangerous interactions between the operations on the encrypted database and the contents of the private counter. To avoid these pitfalls, we have to carefully consider how the queries of the curator are executed so that they do not affect the security of the CPX counters. This results in a scheme we call HPX that has the same (encrypted) query complexity as its underlying encrypted database and (encrypted) update complexity that is linear in the underlying encrypted database's update complexity and in the number of histogram bins. When HPX's encrypted counters are instantiated with CPX, it has private query complexity that is logarithmic in the number of updates 1 .
We note that designing a framework that composes any differentially private algorithm with any structured encryption scheme (while maintaining efficiency) is nontrivial problem and we leave it as an open problem.
Related Work
Differential privacy. In their seminal work [25] , Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith introduced the notion of differential privacy that guarantees privacy of individuals by ensuring similar outputs of queries on data irrespective of whether an individual's information is present or absent in the data. Since its conception, differential privacy has been an active research area [6-9, 29, 44 , 50], we refer the readers to [24, 28] for a comprehensive survey.
Differential privacy has also been deployed in practice, see for example the systems used at Google [30, 31] , Apple [22] , the US Census Bureau [2, 49] and Uber [35, 63] .
Differential privacy with continual observations. Dwork, Naor, Pitassi and Rothblum introduced a new setting for differential privacy [26] where the data is continuously being modified. The motivation was to consider scenarios where data analysis required repeated computations over dynamic data, for example, real-time traffic analysis, social trends observation and disease outbreak discovery. Calandrino, Kilzer, Narayanan, Felten and Shmatikov [12] showed that continual release of statistics leaks more information to the adversary and is a bigger privacy threat. In [26] , the authors construct an -differentially-private continual counter with a small error. Specifically, they show that with probability 1−δ, the error at time step t is at most O( 1 log 1.5 t log 1 δ ). They also show that with probability at least δ, anydifferentially-private mechanism for λ time steps must incur an additive error of at least Ω( 1 (log λ + log 1 δ )). Chan, Shi and Song, in an independent work, also constructed a similar counter with the same privacy and 1 While the HPX construction considers fixed number of histogram bins, Section A of Appendix explains how to extend HPX to setup histogram bins dynamically.
error guarantees [19] . The continual observation model has been widely adopted and several problems have been considered in the literature [3, 13-16, 45, 47, 59, 64, 65] . Structured encryption. Structured encryption (STE) was introduced by Chase and Kamara in [20] as a generalization of searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) [21, 60] . There are STE constructions for various data structures including multi-maps [10, 11, 17, 18, 20, 21, 32, 38, 39, 41, 42, 54] , graphs [20, 36, 51, 67] and two-dimensional arrays [20, 43] .
Snapshot security. Snapshot security was discussed informally in several works [34, 56] but first formalized in the context of property-preserving encryption (PPE) by Lewi and Wu [46] and in the context of STE by Amjad, Kamara and Moataz in [5] .
Preliminaries
Notation. The set of all binary strings of length n is denoted as {0, 1} n , and the set of all finite binary strings as {0, 1} * .
[n] is the set of integers {1, . . . , n}, and 2 [n] is the corresponding power set. We write x ← χ to represent an element x being sampled from a distribution χ. The output x of an algorithm A is denoted by x ← A. Given a sequence v of n elements, we refer to its ith element as v i or v[i]. If S is a set then |S| refers to its cardinality. If x and y are two integer sequences of length n, then || · || denotes the Hamming distance. We denote by Lap(b) the Laplace distribution with parameter b that has probability density function Abstract data types. An abstract data type specifies the functionality of a data structure. It is a collection of data objects together with a set of operations defined on those objects. Examples include sets, dictionaries (also known as key-value stores or associative arrays) and graphs. The operations associated with an abstract data type fall into one of the two categories: query operations, which return information about the objects; and update operations, which modify the objects. If the abstract data type supports only query operations it is static, otherwise it is dynamic. We denote by Q, R, and U the query, response and update spaces of the data object, respectively.
Data structures.
A data structure for a given data type is a representation in some computational model of an object of the given type. 2 Typically, the representation is optimized to support the type's query operation as efficiently as possible. For data types that support multiple queries, the representation is often optimized to efficiently support as many queries as possible. As a concrete example, the dictionary type can be represented using various data structures depending on which queries one wants to support efficiently. Hash tables support Get and Put in expected O(1) time whereas balanced binary search trees support both operations in worst-case log(n) time. For ease of understanding and to match colloquial usage, we will sometimes blur the distinction between data types and structures.
Public-key encryption. A public key encryption scheme is a set of three polynomial-time algorithms AHE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) such that Gen is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter k and returns a pair of private and public keys (sk, pk); Enc is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a public key pk and a message m and returns a ciphertext ct; Dec is a deterministic algorithm that takes a private key sk and a ciphertext c and returns m if pk was the public key under which ct was produced. A public key encryption scheme is an additive homomorphic encryption scheme if for any two messages m 1 and m 2 , and any (sk, pk) ← Gen(1 k ) for all k ∈ N, we have that
Informally, a public key encryption scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks if the ciphertexts it outputs do not reveal any partial information about the plaintext even to an adversary that can adaptively query an encryption oracle.
Structured Encryption
Structured encryption (STE) schemes [20] encrypt data structures in such a way that they can be queried. STE schemes can be distinguished depending on the type of operations they support. This includes non-interactive and interactive schemes where the former require only a single message while the latter require several rounds for queries and updates. STE schemes can also be static or dynamic where the former do not support update operations whereas the latter do. We can also distinguish between response-revealing and response-hiding schemes where the former reveal the response to queries whereas the latter do not.
Interactive response-revealing STE schemes are used as follows. During the setup phase, the client constructs an encrypted data structure EDS under a key K. If the scheme is stateful, the setup also outputs a state st. The server then receives EDS from the client. During the query phase, the client and server execute a two-party protocol where the client inputs its query q, key K and state st while the server inputs the encrypted structure EDS. The client receives a response r and an updated state st while the server receives nothing. Similarly, during the update phase, either an add or remove, the client and server execute a two-party protocol where the client inputs its update u + /u − , key K and state st while the server inputs the encrypted structure EDS. The client receives an updated state st while the server receives an updated structure EDS . We formally define an interactive response-revealing STE as follows: We defer the correctness and security definition of an interactive structured encryption scheme to Appendix B.
A note on operation failures. Similarly to plaintext data structures, operations over encrypted structures may fail. For queries, failures are in general the result of an empty response or the nonexistence of the query in the structure. We typically capture a query failure by a null ⊥ element added to the data type response space. However, update failures are in general more complex. For example, in set data structures, an add update might fail if the element already exists in the structure. An update also might fail if it intends to remove an element that does not exist or simply because the structure is empty. At a high level, we say that an update fails if the update does not modify the encrypted structure. Formally, an update u + ∈ U fails if EDS = EDS where
A note on data structures and databases. Our main construction, HPX, can be used to support histogram queries on any encrypted data structure. Unfortunately, most of the differential privacy and cryptography literature does not distinguish between data structures (e.g., arrays, two-dimensional arrays, dictionaries, multi-maps, trees etc.) and databases (e.g., relational databases, NoSQL databases). So to remain consistent with the literature, in the remainder of this paper we will refer to arbitrary data structures as databases. So anytime we refer to a database DB or an encrypted database EDB what we mean is some arbitrary data structure DS and some arbitrary encrypted data structure EDS, respectively.
Private Structured Encryption
In this Section, we extend the notion of STE to support private queries. We refer to the resulting primitive as a private structured encryption (PSTE) scheme. With a PSTE scheme, a curator can encrypt its database in such a way that it can query and manage its database through a set of encrypted queries and such that an analyst can query the database through a set of private queries. In Definition 4.1 below, we describe the syntax of a PSTE scheme. Here, we only describe schemes that support one encrypted and one private query operations but the syntax can be extended to support schemes with multiple encrypted and private queries in the natural way.
Definition 4.1 (Private structured encryption).
An interactive private structured encryption scheme ∆ = Setup, EAdd, ERemove, EQuery, PQuery consists of five polynomial-time protocols that work as follows:
is a three-party protocol between the curator C, the server S and the analyst A. The curator inputs the security parameter 1 k , the privacy parameter and a database DB, while the server and the analyst input nothing. The curator receives a state st and a key K C , the server receives an encrypted database PEDB and the analyst receives a key K A .
two-party protocol between the curator C and the server S. The curator inputs its state st, a key K C and an update u + ∈ U, while the server inputs the encrypted database PEDB. As output, the curator receives the updated state st and the server receives an updated encrypted database PEDB . A PSTE scheme is used as follows. During a setup phase, the curator, server and analyst execute the Setup protocol on the curator's database DB. This results in a secret key K C and state st for the curator, an encrypted database PEDB for the server and a secret key K A for the analyst. To query the database, the curator executes the EQuery protocol with the server. To manage the database (i.e., to add or remove items), it executes the EAdd and ERemove protocols with the server. To perform a statistical query on the data, the analyst executes the PQuery protocol with the server. Note that the syntax of a PSTE scheme is similar to that of an STE scheme since the curator uses the STE operations to manage its encrypted database. The main difference is the addition of a PQuery protocol which is needed for the analyst to perform its analytical queries.
Correctness and Utility
We say that a PSTE scheme is correct if the encrypted query protocol always returns the correct response with high probability (possibly) on an updated encrypted database output by an update operation (addition or removal operation) that has previously occurred. Moreover, correctness also should hold independently of the private queries made by the analyst. We formally define correctness as follows. Utility. The correctness definition above guarantees that the curator will get correct responses to its encrypted queries (with high probability) but does not say anything about the utility of the analyst's private queries. Intuitively, in the setting of differential privacy we say that a mechanism is useful if its responses are close to the correct responses. Here, we apply the same intuition to the encrypted database's PQuery operation. More precisely, we say that PQuery is (α, δ)-useful if, with probability at least 1 − δ, it produces responses within an additive factor of α to the true response. We formally define this below.
Definition 4.2 (Correctness). Let
∆ = (Setup, EAdd, ERemove, EQuery, PQuery) be a PSTE scheme. We say that ∆ is correct if for all k ∈ N, for all > 0, for all poly(k)-size databases DB 0 , for all (st, K C ; PEDB 0 ; K A ) output by Setup (1 k , , DB 0 ); ⊥; ⊥ and all poly(k)-size sequences of operations σ = (σ 1 , · · · , σ λ ), for all i ∈ [λ], if σ i = q i , then EQuery(st i−1 , K C , q i ; PEDB i−1 )
Definition 4.3 (Utility)
. Let ∆ = (Setup, EAdd, ERemove, EQuery, PQuery) be a PSTE scheme. We say that ∆ is 
Security and Privacy
As discussed in Section 1, our adversarial setting is more complex than that of STE and of differential privacy. In particular, in our context we have to consider two adversaries: namely, the server and the analyst. In addition, the server can be corrupted in two possible ways: a persistent corruption and a snapshot corruption. We summarize these models as follows:
-a persistent adversary corrupts the server perpetually. It has access to the encrypted database and can monitor both the encrypted and private query operations. This captures a corrupted server (e.g., an untrusted cloud service or a possibly corrupted onpremise server). -a snapshot adversary is an adversary that corrupts the server only at fixed points in time. It can access a copy of the encrypted database at the time of corruption, but cannot see the encrypted or private query operations. This models certain kinds of data-breaches, subpoenas and thefts. -a statistical adversary is an adversary that corrupts the analyst. It can see the responses to the private queries but cannot see encrypted private database or the encrypted query/update operations. This captures an untrusted analyst.
Collusions. While providing security against each of these adversaries is non-trivial, we will discuss in Section 7 how to maintain the same security guarantees when some of these adversaries collude. Specifically, we will consider the cases when: (1) a snapshot adversary colludes with a statistical adversary; and (2) a persistent adversary colludes with a statistical adversary. Note that the case of a snapshot adversary colluding with a persistent adversary reduces to the case of a persistent adversary.
Security against a persistent adversary. The security of PSTE schemes is a natural extension of the security of standard STE schemes. Intuitively, we require that a PSTE scheme guarantees that the encrypted database reveals no information about its underlying database beyond the setup leakage L S ; that the encrypted query protocol reveals no information about the database and the query beyond the query leakage L Q ; that the add and remove protocols reveal no information about the database and the updates u + and u − , respectively, than the add and remove leakages L A and L R ; and that the private query protocol reveals no information about the database and the private query q p beyond the private query leakage L P . If this holds for non-adaptively chosen operations then this is referred to as non-adaptive security. If, on the other hand, the operations can be chosen adaptively, we have the stronger notion of adaptive security [20, 21] . 
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all z ∈ {0, 1} * , the following expression is negligible in k:
Security against a snapshot adversary. Security against a persistent adversary is a strong notion of security in that it guarantees security against an adversary that not only has access to the encrypted database but also to transcripts of the operations. In many real-world scenarios, however, we are concerned with a weaker adversary that can periodically access the encrypted database but, in particular, cannot access any of the query transcripts. This captures, for example, certain kinds of data breaches, malicious employees, thefts and subpoenas. This kind of adversary is referred to as a snapshot adversary and it was recently formalized in the context of structured encryption by Amjad, Kamara and Moataz [5] .
In the following Definition, we adapt the formalization of [5] to our context. Intuitively, the adversary is given access to multiple snapshots of the encrypted database each of which is interspersed with a batch of encrypted and private queries (and updates). We then require that encrypted database reveals no information about the underlying database and the sequence of operations executed prior to the snapshot, beyond some snapshot leakage L SN . In the worst case, the adversary can have a snapshot after every operation. which results in
Definition 4.5 (Snapshot security
Finally, A outputs a bit b that is output by the experiment. We say that ∆ is (n, L SN )-snapshot secure if there exists a ppt simulator S such that for all ppt adversaries A, for all > 0 and all z ∈ {0, 1} * , the following expression is negligible in k:
Breach resistance. In [5] , the authors formalize the notion of a breach-resistant STE scheme as a scheme with snapshot leakage that reveals at most the size of the underlying structure at the time of the snapshot. We extend this to the setting of private structured encryption by allowing the snapshot leakage to include, in addition, the size of the private query space.
Definition 4.6 (Breach resistance
where DB i is the structure that results from applying σ 1 , . . . , σ i to DB 0 and P is the private query space.
Remark. Note that our security definitions for PSTE against both persistent and snapshot adversaries are inspired from previous works [5, 20, 21] . The main difference, however, is that we allow the analyst to perform PQuery operations as part of the overall sequence of operations. In fact, the analyst's queries can also impact the encrypted structure so an additional leakage pattern needs to be considered in our security definitions.
Security against a statistical adversary. We now turn to our notion of privacy against a statistical adversary which captures privacy against an untrusted analyst. Specifically, we wish to guarantee differential privacy against the analyst. Informally, differential privacy formalizes privacy by requiring that the probability of the output of a mechanism is roughly the same for any two "neighboring" databases.
Continual observations. In our setting, we do not have a fixed database so we cannot use the standard definition of differential privacy. Because our database is dynamic we need a variant referred to as differential privacy under continual observations [26] . This definition is formalized as follows. Let M be a privacy mechanism, let S ⊆ Im(M) λ and let DB 0 be a database. The definition says that M is -differentially-private over continual observations if for all neighboring sequences of curator operations σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ λ ) and σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ λ ),
where DB i results from applying σ i to DB i−1 and DB i results from applying σ i to DB i−1 . In our context, the PQuery protocol is effectively a private mechanism so it would be tempting to just apply the definition above.
Variable queries. The difficulty with this is that in the definition above, the mechanism M is a fixed operation that has no operand whereas PQuery allows the analyst to choose an operand q p . There are several possible ways to handle this but here we take the worst-case which is to assume that, after each curator operation, the analyst makes every possible private query q p ∈ P. If we can quantify the privacy against such an analyst, it will provide an upper bound on the privacy we achieve against all possible analysts. Before we formalize this intuition, we describe our notion of neighboring sequences. Let an operation σ be composed of an operator/operand pair (op, o). We consider two sequences of curator update operations σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ λ ) and σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ λ ) neighbors if they differ by at most a single update operation and operand; that is, there exists at most a single i ∈ [λ] such that 
Definition 4.7 (Differential privacy). Let

CPX: A Private Encrypted Counter
A counter is a data structure that stores an integer and supports Add and Read operations. Add takes as input a counter ctr and an integer a ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and returns an updated counter ctr that stores c + a, where c is the current value of the counter. The Read operation takes as input a counter ctr and returns its current value. Counters are a basic data structure that are heavily used throughout all of computer science.
A private counter [19, 26] is a counter that supports a differentially-private read operation. This is typically achieved by adding noise to the counter value. In this section, we are concerned with designing an encrypted private counter which supports encrypted add operations and private read operations. Note that CPX builds on the binary mechanism of Chan et al. [19] . While CPX follows almost the same steps as [19] , it adds noise and increments the counters homomorphically as opposed to over plaintext values. Our modification also relies on slight changes to the way the counter is set up. Below, we recall the binary mechanism and describe our new encrypted add operations.
The binary mechanism. The binary mechanism is a differentially-private (under continual observations) counter introduced by Chan, Shi and Song [19] which offers reasonable privacy and utility tradeoffs. The counter supports increment, decrement and no-op operations represented as additions of values in {−1, 0, 1}. When read, it returns a value that is the true counter with some noise added to it. The counter is represented as a range tree with a local register. The local register just stores the total number of addition operations performed until now. A range tree is a complete binary tree T that stores values in such a way that all the values within a range can be computed efficiently. More precisely, range trees maintain a tree with λ leaves associated to λ values. Each node in the tree represents a unique range: the tth leaf represents the range [t, t] whereas an internal node that is the root of a subtree with leaves ranging from t 1 to t 2 represents the range [t 1 , t 2 ]. The cover of a range [t 1 , t 2 ] is defined as the set of nodes such that the union of the ranges of the nodes is equal to [t 1 , t 2 ]. The minimum cover is the cover with minimum cardinality. Range trees have the property that the size of the minimum cover of a range [1, t] , for any t, is at most 2 log t.
We abuse the notation and refer to the minimum cover of [1, t] as the minimum cover of t.
During setup, the binary mechanism takes as input a parameter λ denoting the maximum number of addition operations to be performed on the counter, and it initializes a range tree with λ leaves. Each node stores a value of 0. For the tth add operation, it takes as input a value a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, and adds a to all the nodes on the path from [t, t] to the root. It also adds noise γ t ← Lap(2 log λ/ ) to all the nodes of the form [·, t] on this path. To answer read operations, the mechanism outputs the sum of the nodes in the minimum cover of t, where t is the current register value which denotes the number of add operations performed until this point.
We now describe an encrypted private counter based on the binary mechanism called CPX. Our construction is described in Fig. (1) and works as follows.
Setup. The Setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1 k , the privacy parameter and the number of update operations to be made λ. The curator initializes a binary tree T with λ leaves where every node consists of an additively-homomorphic encryption of 0. The private encrypted counter ectr is a tuple composed of the tree T, the privacy parameter , a time step t initialized to 0 and the public key of the homomorphic encryption.
Encrypted add.
To add an integer a ∈ {−1, 0, 1} to the encrypted counter, the curator sends the encryption of the integer ct a to the server. The server, given the time step t, first fetches all the nodes in the path P t starting from the root and ending at the leaf [t, t]. The server then adds ct a to every node in P t . The server then selects all nodes in P t with a range of the form [., t], to which it adds the encryption of a freshly sampled noise. The server also increments the internal time step t. Private read. To read the value of the counter after the ith operation, the server simply sends to the analyst the sum of all nodes belonging to the minimum cover of [1, i] which the analyst later decrypts.
Efficiency and Utility
The complexity of both the encrypted add and private query are
where λ is the upper bound on the number of updates while time AHE is the time complexity of a homomorphic Let Lap(·) denote the Laplace distribution. Let AHE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. Consider the private encrypted counter scheme ∆ctr = (Setup, EAdd, PRead) defined as follows:
-Setup 1 k , , λ, ctr : 1. generate (pk, sk) ← AHE.Gen(1 k ); 2. initialize a binary tree T with λ leaves; 3. for each node N ∈ T, (a) set N = AHE.Enc(pk, 0); 4. set t = 0; 5. C receives K C = pk, S receives ectr = (T, , t, pk) and A receives K A = sk;
-EAdd C,S K C , a; ectr : 1. S parses ectr as (T, , t, pk); 2. S sets t = t + 1; 3. C sends cta ← AHE.Enc operation. This stems from the fact that the size of the minimum cover in a range tree is upper bounded by 2 log λ. Moreover, the round complexity of both protocols is equal to 1.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is in Appendix. C.1.
Security
In the following, we detail the security guarantees of CPX against persistent, snapshot and statistical adversaries, respectively.
Against a persistent adversary. The setup leakage of CPX consists of the size of the tree which is equal to the upper bound on the number of updates λ such that
Both the add leakage and the private query leakage of CPX are equal to ⊥ as they do not depend of the curator's input such that
The proof of Theorem 5.2 is deferred to the full version of the paper.
Leakage against a snapshot adversary. The snapshot leakage L ctr SN of CPX is equal, for all i
The proof of Theorem 5.3 is deferred to the full version of the paper. Note that CPX is breach-resistant based on Definition 4.6 when m = poly(k).
Against a statistical adversary. As detailed above, CPX is an encrypted variant of the binary mechanism.
In particular, the private responses of CPX have the same exact distribution (on the same sequences of operations) as the binary mechanism and, therefore inherits the same differential privacy parameters. In particular we have the following Theorem.
Theorem 5.4. The PRead protocol in CPX isdifferentially private as per Definition 4.7.
The proof of this theorem is similar to the one of the binary mechanism in [19] and we defer it to the full version of this work.
HPX: An Encrypted Database for Private Histograms Queries
In this section, we describe our encrypted database scheme, HPX, which supports private histogram queries. With our solution, a curator can outsource its statistical database to an untrusted server. The curator can update the data using the EDB's encrypted queries and an analyst can analyze the data using the EDB's private queries. We note that while our work relies on the counter of Chan et al., we address a different problem than the one considered in [19, 26] . While these works construct pan-private counters, we design an encrypted database that supports differentially-private histogram queries. In the setting of [19, 26] , the curator is a trusted party that stores a pan-private counter and answers read queries from an untrusted analyst. In our setting, the curator first outsources its encrypted database to an untrusted server. It can then query and update its outsourced encrypted database by interacting with the server. In addition, an untrusted analyst can make differentially-private histogram queries on the encrypted database by interacting with the untrusted server. As one can see, we not only consider a different object than [19, 26] , but our adversarial model is also very different: in addition, to an adversarial analyst, we also have to consider an adversarial server.
Overview. At a high-level, HPX works as follows. We are given a database DB and a histogram H = {ctr 1 , . . . , ctr n } initialized to 0. We also assume the existence of a function Map 1 that maps database updates u to multiple counters in H. Our construction produces (n + 1) encrypted structures: EDB and ectr 1 , . . . , ectr n . The first results from encrypting the database DB with an appropriate structured encryption scheme. The curator interacts with EDB to query and update its database. The structures (ectr 1 , . . . , ectr n ) are private encryptions of the histogram counters (ctr 1 , . . . , ctr n ) and are used by the server to answer the analyst's queries. Whenever the curator successfully updates its EDB with an update u + , it also increments the ith counter ctr i by 1, where i ∈ Map 1 (u + ). To hide which counter was updated, however, it also increments all the remaining counters by 0. The efficiency of our scheme depends on the efficiency of the underlying encrypted database EDB and is linear in n. In terms of security, we provide a black-box leakage analysis of HPX's leakage. We then show that if its underlying encrypted structures are instantiated with zero leakage or almost zero-leakage constructions then HPX's leakage profile is minimal.
HPX makes use of a dynamic response-hiding structured encryption scheme Σ DB = (Setup, Query, Add, Remove) and a private encrypted counter scheme ∆ ctr = (Setup, EAdd, PRead) (e.g., the construction described in Section 5). Our construction is described in detail in Figs. (2) and (3) and works as follows.
Setup. The Setup algorithm takes as input a database DB and the size of the histogram n. It initializes n counters (ctr 1 , . . . , ctr n ). It then encrypts DB with Σ DB which results in EDB, and encrypts each ctr i with ∆ ctr which results in (ectr 1 , . . . , ectr n ). The private EDB is PEDB = (EDB, ectr 1 , . . . , ectr n ).
Encrypted queries.
To query the EDB, the curator and server execute the ∆.Query protocol where the curator inputs its query q and the server inputs PEDB. This protocol in turn executes EDB's query protocol on the same inputs and returns the response to the curator.
Database updates. To add or remove an item u to/from the database, the curator first updates EDB using the appropriate update protocol (either Σ DB .Add or Σ DB .Remove). The server then returns a message to the curator indicating whether the operation succeeded or failed. The curator and server then update all the private encrypted counters (ectr 1 , . . . , ectr n ) as follows. If the operation succeeded and i ∈ Map 1 (u) (i.e., the update is associated to the ith counter) then ectr i is incremented by 1 (in case of addition, otherwise it is decremented by 1), otherwise ectr i is incremented by 0. Incrementing all the counters-even the ones that are not relevant to the update-hides which counter is updated from the server. This is crucial to hide the values of the histogram from the server. To see why, suppose we did not hide which counter is updated after an EDB operation (i.e., an EAdd or ERemove). Note that the server knows whether the EDB operation was an add or a remove and whether the operation succeeded or failed. It can determine the success or failure simply by comparing EDB to EDB . If, in addition to this, it also knew which counter got updated after the EDB operation, it would know whether that counter was incremented, decremented or kept constant. And from this information the server effectively knows the histogram.
Private queries. To query the ith counter, the analyst and the server execute a private read operation on ectr i .
Efficiency and Utility
The query complexity of HPX is equal to the query complexity of the underlying database encryption scheme Σ DB . In other words, its query complexity is
where time q DB is the query complexity Σ DB . Similarly, the round complexity of the query protocol is equal to the round complexity of the query protocol of Σ DB . The update complexity (whether it is an EAdd or a ERemove) Let Σ DB = (Setup, Query, Add, Remove) be a database encryption scheme and let ∆ctr = (Gen, Setup, EAdd, PRead) be a PSTE scheme for counters. Let λ be a upper bound on the number of updates and be the differential privacy parameter. Consider the PSTE scheme ∆ HIS = (Setup, EAdd, ERemove, EQuery, PHist) defined as follows:
-Setup C,S,A 1 k , , DB ; ⊥; ⊥ :
-EAdd C,S st C , K C , u + ; PEDB :
4. if EDB = EDB then S sets fail = 1 otherwise it sets fail = 0; 5. S sends fail to C; 6. for all i ∈ of HPX is
where time u DB is the update complexity of the database encryption scheme Σ DB , time ctr is the add complexity of the private counter encryption scheme ∆ ctr , n is the number of bins in the histogram, and λ is the upper bound on the number of updates. We stress that even though the update complexity is linear in n, the number of bins is often decided a-priori by the analyst and is usually a small constant [4, 48, 58, 66] . In this case, the update complexity of HPX is Similarly, the round complexity is equal to the round complexity of the private query complexity of ∆ ctr .
The round complexity of both
Additional remarks about update complexity. As discussed above, in practice, the number of bins is a small constant but there are applications where the number of bins might be ω (1) . In particular, Sturges [61] shows that, when the data is approximately normally distributed, then setting n to n = 1 + log |U| is sufficient for data analytics, where U is the update space of the database. In this case, the update complexity is equal to
Note also that there is a variant of our construction that reduces the update complexity to
at the cost of increasing the private query complexity to
Due to space limitation, we defer the details of this variant to the full version of this work.
, and , δ > 0.
The utility of HPX is equal to the utility of CPX. This is because for each private query, one of the counters is read and returned.
Security
In the following, we detail the security guarantees of HPX against standard, snapshot and statistical adversaries, respectively.
Security against a persistent adversary. The setup leakage of HPX consists of the setup leakage of its underlying building blocks. In particular, this includes the setup leakage of the database encryption scheme and the setup leakage of the encrypted private counter, for all n counters. The query leakage is equal to the query leakage of the underlying database encryption scheme. The update leakage, whether it is an add or remove leakage, includes the update leakage of the underlying database encryption scheme and, for all i ∈ [n], the add leakage of the underlying encrypted private counter scheme. The private query leakage of a query consists of, the private query leakage of the underlying private counter scheme along with the counter identifier. We now give a precise description of HPX's leakage profile and show that it is adaptively-secure with respect to it. Its setup leakage is
.
Its query leakage is equal to
Its respective add and remove leakages L A and L R on the respective add and remove updates u + and u − are equal to for all a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
Its private query leakage is equal to
The proof of Theorem 6.2 deferred to the full version of the paper.
Security against a snapshot adversary. The snapshot leakage L SN of HPX is equal to the snapshot leakage of its underlying primitives such that
The proof of Theorem 6.3 is deferred to the full version of the paper. Clearly, if both Σ DB and ∆ ctr are breachresistant then HPX is breach-resistant as well based on Definition 4.6.
Leakage vs. update complexity and utility. Recall that the update complexity is linear in n because all the counters are updated during an HPX update. More precisely, the counters in Map 1 (v) are incremented with +1/ − 1 and the rest are incremented with 0. This is to hide the identity of the counters in Map 1 (v) from the adversaries. If one is willing to leak this, the update complexity improves to
while the add/remove leakage and the snapshot leakage will now include, in addition, the identities of the updated counters Map 1 (v). This will also improve the utility of the counters because, roughly speaking, they will be incremented less often so less noise will be added.
Security against a statistical adversary. To show that our HPX construction is differentially private, we need to show that PHist is differentially private as per Definition 4.7. For this, we first show that any two neighboring update operation sequences induce operation sequences on the counters that differ in at most two time places (refer to Lemma D.2).As the next step of the proof, we show that, given that ∆ ctr is differentially private, PHist is differentially private. We state below our main theorem. We provide the proof of Theorem 6.4 in Appendix D.1.
Handling Collusions
In this Section, we describe how our constructions can be extended to handle collusions.
Snapshot and statistical adversary. First, note that collusion between a snapshot and statistical adversary is equivalent to the adversary considered in the panprivacy literature. In [19] , Chan et al. construct a panprivate counter for a single unannounced intrusion and multiple announced intrusions based on the same binary mechanism described in Section 5. In the former, additional noise is added to all the nodes of the binary tree during setup to prevent the adversary from getting the real node values at the time of intrusion. This added noise protects against the intrusion but degrades the utility by a factor of 2. They then extend this method to support multiple announced intrusions by adding increasing amounts of noise and further degrading the utility. In particular, k intrusions reduce the utility by O( √ k + 1). To handle this kind of collusion, it suffices to replace all the counters in CPX with the pan-private counters of [19] . To encrypt the database, we then use snapshotsecure STE scheme with zero-leakage; that is, with leakage that reveals at most some public parameter (e.g., the security parameter or any parameter that is chosen independently of the database). Note that this is simple to achieve by padding the database and encrypting it with a breach-resistant STE scheme [5] .
Persistent and statistical adversary. This is a stronger setting than above because achieving differential privacy requires us to hide whether an add or a remove operation occurred. This is particularly difficult to do against an adversary that holds the encrypted database EDB because the size of EDB before and after an operation reveals which operation occured. This essentially requires us to use an EDB with zero-leakage updates. Another challenge is that many STE schemes leak the sizes of query responses which could be correlated with the size of EDB. To handle this, we need to use an STE scheme with zero-leakage queries. One possible instantiation is to make use of ORAM simulation [33] where all query responses in the database have to be padded to be equal to the same length-a function of some public parameter. This instantiation, however, will induce a polylogarithmic multiplicative overhead on both the query and update complexities.
Notice that when the persistent and statistical adversaries collude, there is no need to encrypt the counters since the analyst holds the decryption key. In addition, since the server samples the noise for the counters, it can easily infer the increments made. We can therefore use plaintext counters maintained in a simple register (i.e., there is no need to use the binary tree mechanism of Chan et al.) and use the following approach to maintain them. To increment the counters, the curator sends to the server an increment of +1/ − 1/0 with noise for each counter. Upon receiving the noisy increment, it adds it to the current value in the register. The PRead protocol returns the current register value. We note that this approach is similar to the second simple counting mechanism of [19] . In fact, using a proof very similar to that of Theorem 1.3 of [19] , this approach can be shown to be -differentially private and [26] , proving that this construction is almost tight.
Efficiency Estimates
In this Section, we estimate the efficiency of our construction. To do this we conducted micro-benchmarks of all the building blocks and then estimated the cost of the various HPX operations. We now explain why our methodology is sound. Recall that the update complexity of HPX is
and time ctr (λ) = log λ · time AHE . Since, the add complexity of the private encrypted counter is independent of the data and is fixed, the update complexity of HPX on real data depends solely on the update complexity of the database encryption scheme time u DB (since we use the database encryption scheme in a black-box way). Note that this time depends on the specific instantiation used and these running times have been well documented in the relevant works [5, 11, 17, 18] . The same argument holds for encrypted queries and private queries.
Experimental setup. We consider the case where the additively-homomorphic encryption scheme is instantiated with Paillier [55] . We further assume the database is a multi-map and is encrypted using DLS, the dualsecure multi-map encryption scheme of Amjad, Kamara and Moataz [5] . We used implementations of Paillier and DLS from the Javaillier [1] and Clusion libraries [52] , respectively. Our test environment was a MacBook Pro 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 with 16 GB of memory.
Micro-benchmarks.
We instantiated Paillier with a 2048-bit key. Key generation, encryption, decryption and addition took on average 446, 70, 18 and 0.08 ms, respectively. Experiments in [5] reported that with a multi-map MM holding 10 millions pairs, their multimap encryption scheme DLS took 10 minutes during Setup, 1 microsecond during Get and 33 ms during Put. We used Sturges' formula on our dataset to determine the bins, which resulted in 25 bins. We set λ = 2 32 ≈ 4.3 billion.
Estimates. Based on the micro-benchmarks above, for a multi-map holding 10 million pairs, we have the following estimates for the HPX operations:
-Setup takes time 
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If this holds for non-adaptively chosen operations then the scheme is said to be non-adaptively secure. If, on the other hand, the operations can be chosen adaptively, the scheme is said to be adaptively-secure. [19] . The main difference is the sensitivity of the "sum" function. Chan et al. consider Add operands from {0, 1} whereas we consider Add operands from {−1, 0, 1}. Because of this the senstivity of our "sum" function is 2 as opposed to 1. In turn, this affects the differential privacy by a multiplicative factor of 2 but this can be factor traded-off for utility by scaling the Laplacian noise appropriately. Note that this factor is subsumed above in the asymptotic notation.
D HPX Proofs
D.1 Proof of Theorem 6.4
Recall that in our construction, every update operation of the curator induces an EAdd operation on all the counters. The operand however differs from counter to counter. For example, a successful ERemove of operand o by the curator leads to a −1 being added to all counters in Map 1 (o), while 0 to the rest of the counters. Similarly, a successful EAdd of operand o leads to a 1 being added to all counters in Map 1 (o), while 0 to the rest of the counters. Therefore, the operation that is induced on the counters is always EAdd but the operands come from {−1, 0, 1}. We therefore slightly abuse the notation and say that a curator's update operation induces an operation in {−1, 0, 1} on the counters.
Before introducing our lemma and our main theorem, we set up some notations. Let σ = (op 1 , o 1 ) We abuse the notation and we set and similarly .
In the following, we show that any update operation sequences that differ in at most one operation, lead to two operation mapped sequences that differ in at most two operations.
We first start by showing that any two counter mapped sequences that differ in at most one operation, lead to two operation mapped sequences that differ in at most two operations. Note that this result only applies to set-like failures. 4 We assume the same thing for σ as well.
We now do the rest of the proof for counter i. Let µ = Map . We also denote by DB 0 and DB 0 the underlying plaintext database before applying the sequence of operations in σ and σ , respectively.
Let t ≤ λ be the position at which the two sequences µ and µ differ at. Thenμ j =μ j , for all j < t. This simply holds by definition of the operation mapped sequences. Note that this also implies that the databases, after the t first operations, contain the same items and we write DB t−1 = DB t−1 . So in order to proof the lemma we need to show that in the remaining positions, i.e., for all j ∈ {t, · · · , λ},μ andμ differ at most at two places. That is, our proof reduces to a counting problem where we need to count the number of indices in {t, · · · , λ} whereμ andμ differ.
Consider the tth operation µ t and µ t . There are three possiblities where µ t and µ t are different: (1) µ t = 1, µ t = −1, (2) µ t = 0, µ t = −1, or (3) µ t = 1, µ t = 0. The other three cases are symmetrical and we ignore them without any loss of generality. We now try to infer what the t th operand o t and o t respectively must be in σ and σ in these three cases. In Let us now consider case (1) again (when µ t = 1, µ t = −1) with o defined as above and count the number of indices in {t, · · · , λ} whereμ andμ differ. The other two cases can be proven on similar lines. Recall that DB t−1 = DB t−1 , therefore there are two cases at this point : (a) o / ∈ DB t−1 , DB t−1 ; and (b) o ∈ DB t−1 , DB t−1 . Again these cases are symmetrical, so we just describe case (a) in the following. 4 Note that the general case where operations may have different operands can be reduced to the same operand case detailed above. To see why, we can simply map different operands to different sub-sequences in such a way that every sub-sequence operates on the same operand. Note that there will be only one sub-sequence that have different operations in this case.
